Full title: Jerold S. RAWSON, on behalf of himself and a class, Plaintiff, v. SOURCE…
Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Date published: Jan 6, 2016
Facts
Plaintiff Jerold S. Rawson complains on behalf of himself and a class that the defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in two respects. In Count I of his complaint, he claims that the defendants unlawfully failed to identify the current owner of the debt they sought to collect, and in Count II, he asserts that the defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices by seeking to collect time-barred debts without disclosing that the debts were not legally enforceable. I previously denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification. See DN 84, 162. Now before me are cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Issue
Decision
In Slick, Judge Durkin similarly concluded that extrinsic evidence was unnecessary under McMahon to prove that a letter seeking to collect a time-barred debt that failed to disclose the debt’s age or legal status would mislead an unsophisticated consumer. 111 F.Supp.3d at 905–06. He acknowledged that McMahon expressly declined to hold that “it is automatically improper for a debt collector to seek re-payment of time-barred debts; some people might consider full debt repayment a moral obligation, even though the debt has been extinguished.” 744 F.3d at 1020. Judge Durkin nevertheless held that a dunning letter that was “completely silent” about the legal status of a time-barred was facially misleading, considering it “far-fetched to suppose that unsophisticated consumers assume that debt-collection agencies asking for payment are just appealing to the consumers’ sense of moral duty.” Slick , 111 F.Supp.3d at 904. I agree, and the defendants offer no persuasive grounds on which to distinguish either Slick or Pantoja.
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